

## ILLOCUTION, MOOD AND MODALITY IN A FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR OF SPANISH

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### ABSTRACT

In order to be able to account for the alternating and non-alternating uses of mood in Spanish this paper explores the field of illocution and modality and argues for two elaborations of the Functional Grammar framework: (i) a representation of main clauses which distinguishes between several layers, each representing a different subact of the speech act, and (ii) a representation of noun clauses which distinguishes between non-factive, factive, and semi-factive complements.

### 0. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Many papers have been devoted to the treatment of the Spanish indicative and subjunctive. And many of the studies contained in these papers were aimed at arriving at one definition of the meaning of the subjunctive in all its different uses. In this paper, yet another attempt to provide a satisfactory description of the Spanish mood system, a different line of research is followed, based on the following assumptions:

- (i) Only in those contexts in which both indicative and subjunctive may appear under identical conditions may they be said to add to the meaning of the sentence in which they occur. This does not imply that their unique occurrence in other contexts is purely at random.
- (ii) There is no reason to assume *a priori* that the subjunctive is the marked member of the pair.
- (iii) The meaning of the subjunctive or indicative (in those cases in which they may be said to have a meaning of their own, cf. (i)) should be determined from context to context, although the possibly different meanings of either of them in these different contexts may have certain elements in common.

The different problems related to the treatment of the mood system of Spanish will be addressed within the framework of Functional Grammar (FG). Some basic principles of this theory are presented in section 1. In section 2

I discuss some general issues related to the treatment of mood. In particular, I go into the notions *illocutionary force* and *modality* and argue that these notions pertain to different levels of the speech act, and that mood inflection may fulfil a distinguishing function at both levels. In 2.1 illocutionary force and its representation in FG as proposed by Dik (forthcoming) is discussed separately. In 2.2 I address the question what kinds of modal distinctions a language may be expected to make. I propose to distinguish three different types of modality and discuss the different modal distinctions to be made within each of these types. To conclude section 2 I present an adaptation of the clause model proposed by Dik (ibid.) and locate the three types of modality within this model. In section 3 I turn my attention to the Spanish data. The use of mood inflection in main clauses and embedded predications in Spanish is discussed in relation to illocutionary force (3.1), modal contexts (3.2), and non-modal contexts (3.3). The use of mood in adverbial and relative clauses will not be touched upon. In section 4 I go into the relations between the different uses of the subjunctive and indicative.

#### 1. SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR

In FG, linguistic expressions are represented in underlying predications, in which the semantic, syntactic and pragmatic functions indicating the different relations holding between the participants in a State of Affairs (SoA) are represented. To form such an underlying predication, a predicate frame is selected from the lexicon. A predicate frame contains, among other things, a predicate, which may be either basic or derived, and a number of argument positions, each provided with a semantic function specifying the role the arguments fulfil in the SoA's designated by the predications built on the basis of this particular predicate frame. An example is:

(1)  $\text{Build}_V (x_1)_{Ag} (x_2)_{Go}$

In the argument positions of such a predicate frame terms are inserted. Terms are referring expressions, which may have a complex structure. Term insertion in the argument positions of (1) leads to, for instance:

(2)  $\text{Build}_V (x_1: \text{boy}_N (x_1))_{Ag} (x_2: \text{shed}_N (x_2))_{Go}$

No attention is given here to the internal structure of terms. Pragmatic functions may be assigned to the arguments to specify their informational status and syntactic functions to specify the perspective from which a SoA is presented. In the final expression through expression rules of underlying

representations like (2) operators fulfil an important function. They should be regarded as abstract elements, representing semantic distinctions coded in a language through grammatical means. Different types of operators are distinguished: term operators and predicate operators. Term operators take care of e.g. definiteness and number. Predicate operators take care of grammatical distinctions which are coded on or near the predicate, such as Tense, Mood, Aspect and Polarity. The term 'Mood' is thus restricted to modality expressed through grammatical means. Specification of operators in (2) leads to, for instance:

(3)  $\text{PastProgr Build}_V (\text{dm}x_1: \text{boy}_N (x_1))_{Ag} (i1x_2: \text{shed}_N (x_2))_{Go}$

which will be expressed as:

(4) The boys were building a shed

According to FG, language should be regarded in the first place as an instrument for social interaction. Its aim is therefore to provide the means to explain specific linguistic phenomena, where possible, "in terms of their functionality with respect to the ways they are used and to the ultimate purposes of these uses" and to devise a theory of the language system "in such a way that it can most easily and realistically be incorporated into a wider pragmatic theory of verbal interaction" (Dik 1978:2). Such a theory may be expected to be able to handle the linguistic means through which communicative intention and speaker's judgements are coded in a linguistic system. I hope to show that an adequate treatment of the Spanish mood system requires the incorporation of both levels.

#### 2. ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE AND MODALITY

##### 2.0. Introduction

Executing a speech act has been analyzed since Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) as requiring the execution of a number of subacts on the part of the speaker (S). Among these subacts are the *illocutionary act* and the *propositional act*. In uttering a sentence S not only offers a proposition to the Addressee (A), but also transmits his communicative intention. S has a number of linguistic means at his disposal to code the content or intention he wishes A to recognize in his utterance: proposition indicating elements at the level of the propositional act, and illocutionary force indicating devices at the level of the illocutionary act. The total of proposition indicating elements expresses the propositional content of an utterance. The total

of illocutionary force indicating devices expresses the illocutionary force of an utterance. Every utterance may thus be analyzed according to the following scheme (cf. Dik forthcoming):

(5) ILL(predication)

For the time being I use the term 'predication' instead of 'proposition' in line with the FG terminology introduced earlier. The term 'clause' is used for any combination of a predication with an illocution, as represented in (5).

Mood inflection can be used both as an illocutionary force indicating device and as a proposition indicating element, as is shown for Spanish in section 3 (cf. also Bolkestein 1977, 1980). In this chapter I first discuss both levels and their relation to mood inflection in general terms and then I go on to present a clause model in which both levels are represented.

2.1. Mood and illocutionary force

Illocutionary force indicating devices are those linguistic means through which S transmits his communicative intention. They may be subdivided into lexical and grammatical means. Performative verbs belong to the first category, whereas sentence order and mood belong to the second category. So, anticipating the data to be presented in section 3, an assertion in Spanish is executed most directly by using a performative verb like *asegurar* 'assure', the declarative sentence type and the indicative (I) mood:

- (6) Te aseguro que no es (I) culpa mía.  
'I assure you that it's not my fault.'

Performative verbs are mainly used to produce special effects (see Weijdema et al. 1982). Sentences like (7) are more common:

- (7) No es (I) culpa mía.  
'It's not my fault.'

The only difference between (6) and (7) is that (7) lacks the performative verb present in (6). And often S will intend (7) to be interpreted, like (6), as an assertion. Yet it is not possible to establish a direct relationship between illocutionary act and sentence type or mood. The use of these illocutionary force indicating devices in (7) does not necessarily imply that S intends his utterance to be interpreted as an assertion. A sentence like:


- (8) It's very cold in here,

may for instance be uttered to produce the effect that A closes the window or turns up the heating, depending on the particular speech situation. To account for this fact, Weijdema et al. (1982) distinguish between:

- (9) (i) The illocution-for-the-speaker (ILL<sub>S</sub>): the illocution as intended by S.  
(ii) The illocution-of-the-expression (ILL<sub>E</sub>): the illocution as coded in the linguistic expression.  
(iii) The illocution-for-the-addressee (ILL<sub>A</sub>): the illocution as interpreted by the addressee.

These three categories can be seen as related in the way indicated in (10):

(10) Relations between ILL<sub>S</sub>, ILL<sub>E</sub>, and ILL<sub>A</sub>



A speaker with a given communicative intention has to select "... those linguistic devices which he thinks optimally serve the purpose of eliciting from the hearer a positive reaction to his speech act". Haverkate (1979:11) called this the *allocutionary act*. The successfulness of the strategy chosen by S depends on the recognition by A of the intention of S in the utterance in a given communicative situation.

According to Dik (forthcoming) ILL<sub>E</sub> is generally expressed by means of a number of sentence types, which he considers to be 'grammaticalised carriers of basic illocutions of linguistic expressions' (see also Lyons 1977: ch. 16 and Levinson 1983). He proposes to assign an operator representing ILL<sub>E</sub> to predications. Such an operator triggers the expression rules which account for the formal realization of the different sentence types while at the same time providing the means to link ILL<sub>E</sub> to ILL<sub>S</sub>. In his view the communicative intention of S has relevance for linguistic description only

in so far as linguistic means are used to code this intention in an expression. The fact that, for instance, declarative sentences may be used to make a request should then be explained within a wider pragmatic theory.

Searle's (1969) 'felicity conditions' might be a point of departure for this wider pragmatic theory, as they may shed some light on the question how A reconstructs S's intention, if that intention is not coded explicitly in the expression. The 'preparatory condition' for the act of making an assertion is, for instance, that the information contained in the assertion is not known by A. Suppose now S utters the following sentence:

(11) The window is open,

in a situation in which A knows

- (i) that the window is open;
- (ii) that S knows that he knows that the window is open;
- (iii) that S knows that he knows that S knows that the window is open.

In this situation it will be clear to A, as a consequence of S's violation of the condition, that S has another intention than making an assertion and he will try to reconstruct an alternative  $ILL_S$ . The fact that A has to apply a reconstruction model in which the primary steps concern the systematic check of the conditions associated with the speech act type most directly expressed in a declarative sentence stresses the fact that there is a conventional relationship between sentence type and speech act type. The following representations may now be used to represent direct and indirect speech acts respectively:

- (12) Direct speech act      $ILL_S = ILL_E$   
 Indirect speech act      $ILL_S \neq ILL_E$

The approach discussed here makes it possible to relate the use of a certain sentence type to the operators representing  $ILL_E$ . In 2.3 I will argue that the representation of sentence types in the form of 'illocutionary frames' might be more appropriate. This alternative approach does not affect the present discussion.

Most languages have at least the declarative, interrogative and imperative sentence type. The operators and their paraphrases proposed by Dik (forthcoming) are:

DECL: S wishes A to add the content of the linguistic expression to his pragmatic information.

INT: S wishes A to provide him with the verbal information as requested in the linguistic expression.

IMP: S wishes A to perform the action as specified in the linguistic expression.

These operators can be assigned to independent predications and to predications governed by a speech act verb. In the latter case the subject of the speech act verb is the one who has performed the speech act in the embedded predication. Only in those cases in which S and the subject of the speech act verb are identical and the speech act verb is marked for present tense is the utterance performative. In all other cases an utterance is reported or repeated.

Dik further argues that languages may have a number of grammatical means to convert the basic illocution as expressed by a particular sentence type into a derived illocution. Examples of such 'grammatical converters' are tag questions, elements such as *please*, and alternative intonation patterns.

## 2.2. Mood and modality<sup>2</sup>

Modality, as opposed to illocution, pertains to the domain of propositional content. Lexical or grammatical elements giving expression to modal distinctions are part of the information S wishes to transmit when putting forward for consideration some predication. The different semantic distinctions generally subsumed under the heading 'modality' do not seem to represent a single and coherent semantic category. Instead of providing one definition of modality in general, I distinguish three types of modality and discuss the different kinds of modal distinctions to be made within each of these types, which may be defined as follows:

- Inherent modality: All those linguistic means through which S can *characterize* the relation between a participant in a SoA and the potential actualization of that SoA.
- Objective modality: All those linguistic means through which S can *evaluate* the actuality of a SoA in terms of his knowledge of possible SoA's.
- Epistemological modality: All those linguistic means through which S can *express his commitment* with regard to the truth of a proposition.

### 2.2.1. Inherent modality

The different distinctions to be made within this modality type are all SoA-

internal, as follows from the definition given in the preceding paragraph. The only possible way to give expression to these distinctions is the use of a limited number of (derived) predicates. Therefore this modality type cannot have any bearing on the use of mood inflection. The main inherent modal distinctions, given in (13) are *ability*, *volition*, and a number of instances of *obligation* and *permission*, namely those in which it is reported that some participant in a state of affairs is under the obligation or has received permission to perform in that state of affairs.

- (13) Inherent modality
- |                             |   |                              |
|-----------------------------|---|------------------------------|
| Ability (physical/acquired) | : | 'Be able to' / 'Know how to' |
| Volition                    | : | 'Be willing to'              |
| Obligation                  | : | 'Have to'                    |
| Permission                  | : | 'Be free to'                 |

### 2.2.2. Objective modality

Linguistic means giving expression to objective modal distinctions can be regarded as the output of an evaluation process on the part of S with regard to the actuality status of a SoA. Chung and Timberlake (1985:241) note that "whereas there is basically one way for an event to be actual, there are numerous ways that an event can be less than completely actual". One might simply assume that saying that a SoA is presented as actual is tantamount to saying that it is not modalized. In that case, however, it would be difficult to account for expressions through which S can make explicit that he regards the SoA under consideration to be identical to the situation obtaining in reality, such as *it is the case that*. I therefore include the distinction 'actual' in the category of objective modal distinctions. In the same way that a SoA can be presented as actual, it can be presented as simply non-actual, as in *it is not the case that*. But within the non-actual domain, many other distinctions can be made. To arrive at a further classification of these distinctions a closer look at the evaluation process underlying objective modality is in order. The knowledge on which S has to base his evaluation of a SoA may be subdivided into:

- (14) Two types of knowledge
- (i) Knowledge of possible situations obtaining in S's conception of reality or of a hypothesized situation.
  - (ii) Knowledge of possible situations relative to some system of moral, legal or social conventions.

The labels 'epistemic' and 'deontic' modality are generally used to cover the modal distinctions which depend on S's evaluation in terms of (i) and (ii) respectively.

Some languages do not distinguish systematically between knowledge (i) and (ii), underlying the distinction between epistemic and deontic modality. The English modal *must* can be used to express both certainty and obligation, whereas *may* can be used to express both possibility and permission, although they do impose different restrictions on their complements in these different uses (See Bolkestein 1980; Goossens 1985a). The multiple function of these modals seems to be conditioned by a similar degree of compatibility of the SoA under consideration with S's knowledge of one of the two types. One might ask, then, how this compatibility is measured. A possible answer to this question may be found if we return to the definitions given for the two types of knowledge in (14). It is indicated there that S's knowledge of *possible situations* is the standard for his epistemic or deontic evaluation of a SoA. These possible situations may be represented as combinations of related SoA's. I use the label 'State of the World' (SoW)<sup>3</sup> for each representation of a possible situation. S's evaluating a SoA may now be interpreted as his checking a SoA against SoW's. If all SoW's contain the SoA designated by a predication, then S will arrive at the conclusion 'certain' if he refers to his type (i) knowledge, or 'obligatory' if he refers to his type (ii) knowledge. If only some SoW's contain the SoA under consideration, then S will arrive at the conclusion 'possible' if he refers to his type (i) knowledge, or 'permissible' if he refers to his type (ii) knowledge. Following this analysis, the following distinctions can be said to be roughly equivalent:

(15) SoA is	SoW's in domain	
contained in	(i)	(ii)
a. All	Certain	Obligatory
b. Most	Probable	Customary
c. Some	Possible	Permissible
d. Few	Conceivable	Acceptable
e. No	Impossible	Forbidden
f. ?		Doubtful

Further distinctions can be made. If we assign the value 100 to (a) and 0 to (e), in principle any value in between them might be expressed, although one would not expect languages to have special devices to express, for instance, a value of 78.

'Doubtful' is analyzed in (15f) as S's expressing his inability to provide an evaluation in terms of his knowledge of the SoA under consideration. The fact that complements of adjectives like *doubtful* and verbs like *doubt* take the same form as embedded questions supports this analysis.

The different objective modal distinctions discussed are summarized in (16):

(16) Objective modality	Epistemic	Deontic
Actual	Certain	Obligatory
Non-actual	Probable	Customary
	Possible	Permissible
	Conceivable	Acceptable
	Impossible	Forbidden
	Doubtful	

It follows from the analysis proposed here that elements expressing objective modality take a SoA as designated by a predication in their scope. This means that objective modality can be expressed through predicate operators or embedding predicates only.

### 2.2.3. Epistemological modality

To start my discussion of epistemological modality, I will go into the differences between subjective modality, in my view a subcategory of epistemological modality, and objective modality. These differences have been discussed by Lyons (1977, chs. 16, 17), Bolkestein (1980) and Palmer (1983), among others. Objective modality concerns S's evaluation of a SoA in terms of his knowledge, whereas subjective modality concerns S's expression of the degree of his commitment with regard to the truth of the content of the predication he puts forward for consideration, i.e. it modifies a statement. Modal adverbs give expression to subjective modality, modal adjectives to objective modality. Some of the main differences between objectively and subjectively modalized predications are:

(i) Objectively modalized predications can be questioned, subjectively modalized ones cannot:

(17) Is it possible that John will come?

(18) \*Possibly John will come?

(ii) Objectively modalized predications can be hypothesized in a conditional sentence, subjectively modalized ones cannot:

(19) If it is possible that John will come, I am going home.

(20) \*If possibly John will come, I am going home.

(iii) Subjective modality can be formulated in positive terms only:

(21) \*Impossibly John will come.

(22) \*Uncertainly John will come.

The non-existence of negative modal adverbs corresponds with the fact that the English modals, when used to give expression to subjective modality, cannot appear under negation:

(23) \*John may-not be ill.

(24) \*John mustn't be ill.

Objective modality can be formulated in both positive and negative terms:

(25) It is impossible that John will come.

(26) It is not certain that John will come.

(iv) Subjective modality is bound to the moment of speaking, objective modality is not. Although some of the English modals which can be used to express subjective modality can take the past tense form, this form never has temporal reference but rather expresses a higher degree of reservation on the part of S (see 3.2.2.3.):

(27) It may/might be true.

Past tense inflection on modal adjectives does have temporal reference:

(28) It was possible that John would come, so I went home.

(v) In reaction to an objectively modalized predication the source of the information contained in that predication may be questioned:

(29) A. It is possible that it will rain tomorrow.

B. Who says so?

The same question would seem clearly out of place as a reaction to a subjectively modalized predication:

(30) A. Possibly it will rain tomorrow.

B. \*Who says so?

An appropriate reaction would be:

(31) B. Do you think so?

These differences indicate that subjective modality should be located outside the predication proper, i.e. outside the scope of tense and negation, and protected from the possibility of being hypothesized. Furthermore, the interpretation of subjective modality as concerning the expression of S's commitment with regard to the truth of the content of the predication is confirmed by the fact that it is impossible to question a subjectively modalized predication. Characteristic for questions is the absence of truth commitment on the part of S. As the question of truth value is irrelevant in the case of imperatives, subjective modality is restricted to declarative sentences. I will return to the formalization of subjective modality in 2.3 and for the time being represent subjective modality as expressing S's commitment with regard to the content of a predication as:

(32)  $C_S(\text{predication})$

The difference between objective and subjective modality noted under (v) needs some closer attention. The fact that the source of a subjectively modalized predication cannot be questioned indicates that by subjectively modalizing a predication S reveals himself as the source, as the one who gives a judgement about the information contained in that predication. However, S is not the only possible source. Chung & Timberlake (1985) use the term 'epistemological mode' for those modal distinctions which "... evaluate the actuality of an event with respect to a source". They do not explicitly include subjective modality within this category, but as illustrated by Foley & Van Valin (1984) evidentials do not behave differently from modal adverbs expressing subjective modality. There seems to be reason to speak of one modality type, the members of which have the presence of a source in common. The different modal distinctions mentioned by Chung & Timberlake (1985:244) are:

- (i) Inferential mode, "... in which the event is characterised as inferred from evidence."
- (ii) Quotative mode, "... in which the event is reported from another source."
- (iii) Experiential mode, "... in which the event is characterized as experienced by the source."
- (iv) "The submode in which the event is a construct (thought, belief, fantasy) of the source."

The last, unlabeled category might receive the name 'subjective modality'. Within this category different subdistinctions can be made, expressing different degrees of commitment on the part S. Partly these distinctions parallel the distinctions made within the category of objective epistemic

modality. A decreasing degree of commitment is reflected in the following series of modal adverbs:

(33) Certainly – Probably – Possibly

There appears to be a minimum to the degree of commitment S may express, as reflected in the ungrammaticality of *impossibly*. A possible explanation for this phenomenon might be that a less than minimal degree of commitment would be in conflict with the very act of asserting.

Apart from modal adverbs, the first person present tense forms of some verbs may be used to give expression to subjective modality, such as *I think*, *I suppose*.<sup>4</sup> Some differences in the syntactic behaviour of these forms as opposed to other forms of the same verb will be illustrated for Spanish in chapter 3. Impersonal expressions may be used for evidential, quotative and experiential modality. Examples are *It seems*, *It appears*.

I think at least one more category should be classified as a subjective modal distinction. S may also reveal himself as a source in expressing his wishes, hopes and desires. One might say that S expresses his emotional commitment in these cases. The inclusion of *boulomaic modality* in the category of subjective modality provides the means to explain the existence and underlying structure of sentences like:

(34) I wish he came more often.

This sentence is modalized in two ways: S expresses his wish for a certain situation to obtain while at the same time characterizing this situation as non-actual. So, in a sense, S creates a domain to be evaluated in terms of his knowledge. Anticipating the proposals to be made in 2.3 sentence (34) may be analyzed as modalized at two different levels, the subjective and the objective level (Boul is used as a shorthand notation for *boulomaic subjective modality*):

(35)  $\text{Boul}(\text{Non-act Come}_V(x_1: p3(x_1))_{Ag}(y_1: \text{more often}(y_1))_{Freq})$

Apart from a number of adverbs like *hopefully* the first person present tense forms of verbs like *wish*, *hope*, and *want* may be used to express *boulomaic subjective modality*. A problem in the analysis of the latter forms is that they are probably not only used in their 'world creating' sense but also in a self descriptive one. In the latter case they should rather be analyzed as expressing inherent modality (see 2.2.1.).

The different modal distinctions of the epistemological type may be summarized as follows:

(36)	Epistemological modality			
	Subjective	Epistemic	Certainty (Strong commitment)	
			Probability (Belief)	
			Possibility (Weak commitment)	
		Boulomaic	Wishing, Hoping etc.	
	Inferential			
	Quotative			
	Experiential			

#### 2.2.4. The expression of modality

In the preceding paragraphs three types of modality were discussed. The different ways in which these modality types were analyzed have their repercussions on the different ways in which they may be expressed. Inherent modality was analyzed as operating SoA-internally, objective modality as operating on a SoA as designated by a predication, and epistemological modality as operating on the content of a statement. These different levels and the possible means of expression for the different modality types are represented in (37):

(37) Modality types and their expression


Modality type	Level	Expression	
		Lexical	Grammatical
Inherent	SoA	(Derived) predicate	—
Objective	$K_S(\text{SoA})$	Embedding predicate	Operator
Epistemological	$C_S(\text{Predication})$	Embedding predicate Adverbial	Operator

Both objective and epistemological modality may be expressed through embedding predicates and operators. In 2.3 it will be shown that there is a difference in what they embed or operate on.

#### 2.3. A model for predication and clause


Returning to Searle's (1969) analysis of the speech act, some further subacts may be distinguished, as represented in (38):

(38) Decomposition of the speech act



Using the terminology introduced earlier, the clause may be analyzed in an analogous way:

(39) Decomposition of the clause



In order to be able to represent these formal correlates of the subacts of a speech act in a model for the analysis of utterances I would like to consider an alternative to the approach in which operators represent the basic illocutions of linguistic expressions (see 2.1). Basic to my proposal, which is presented in greater detail in Hengeveld (1988), is the idea that every utterance can be analyzed at two levels: the *representational* and the *interpersonal* level. At the representational level a State of Affair is described in such a way that the addressee is able to understand what external situation is referred to. At the interpersonal level this situation is presented in such a way that the addressee is able to recognize the communicative intention of the speaker. Thus the representational level is concerned with the *narrated event*, the interpersonal level with the *speech event*.

Narrated events can be represented in Functional Grammar in the form of predications, as in (40):

- (40) The representation of narrated events  
 $(e_i: [\text{Write}_V(x_1)]_{Ag}(x_j: \text{book}(x_j))_{Go}] (e_i))$



The predication, between square brackets, is built on the basis of a predicate frame, which contains a number of argument positions, each provided with a semantic function, and a predicate which specifies the relation between these arguments (see section 1). The predication as a whole is presented here as a restrictor of the state of affairs variable  $e$ , as proposed in Vet (1986).

Speech events can be analyzed in an analogous way: Here the participants are the speaker, the addressee, and the content of the utterance. The relation between these three participants is expressed by the basic illocution of the linguistic expression, as specified by the speaker. Basic illocutions can be represented in the form of abstract illocutionary frames, as in:

- (41) DECL (S) (A) (X<sub>1</sub>) Speaker wishes the Addressee to add the content X<sub>1</sub> to his pragmatic information.


An illocutionary frame should be regarded as expressed by the total of illocutionary force indicating devices of a clause, in particular the formal properties of the sentence type, such as word order and sentence mood. Given illocutionary frames of the type illustrated in (41), the general schema for the representation of speech events is as in (42):

- (42) The representation of speech events  
(E<sub>1</sub>: [ ILL<sub>E</sub> (S) (A) (X<sub>1</sub>: [proposition] (X<sub>1</sub>)) ] (E<sub>1</sub>))

Here the abstract illocutionary frame specifies the relation between the speaker (S), the addressee (A), and the content of the utterance (X). The clause as a whole is presented as a restrictor of the utterance variable E.

The representations of narrated event and speech event may be combined into a single representation of the utterance, as in (43):

- (43) The representation of utterances



Starting from the innermost layer, the predication, the functions of the different layers distinguished in (43) should be understood in the following way: A predication gives a description of a set of possible SoA's. By inserting a predication into a narrated event slot (e) it becomes an expression referring to the external situation S has in mind, i.e. a token of the SoA-type designated by a predication. By inserting a fully specified predication into the content slot (X) of an illocutionary frame it becomes an expression referring to the information unit or content transmitted in some speech act. The illocutionary frame contains instructions for A about what S wants him to do with this information unit. By inserting a clause into a speech event slot it becomes an actual speech act, where the speech event variable E provides the deictic center for temporal, spatial and personal reference.

Two aspects of this approach need some elaboration: The illocutionary frames themselves, and their content-argument, represented by (X).

The (X)-variable introduced in the illocutionary frames is a content phrase variable. A predication in (X) represents a third order entity: the content of an utterance. The introduction of this variable makes it possible to distinguish between the two functions of predications: designating states of affairs at the level of the narrated event; and representing contents at the level of the speech event. To distinguish these two functions I use the term 'proposition' to refer to the content function of predications. Possibly (X) may also be taken to be the basic unit of knowledge, where knowledge is regarded as a set of propositions (see Dik 1986a). I will return to this question in my discussion of the Spanish data.

There are at least two parts of grammar in which a separate content phrase variable proves to be useful. Firstly, anaphoric reference may be made to full content phrases, as exemplified in (44):

- (44) A. The weather will be nice tomorrow.  
B. Do you think so?

Anaphoric reference to full content phrases is expressed in English by means of *so*, as in (44B). The interchange in (44) may be represented as:<sup>5</sup>

- (45) A. DECL (S) (A) (X<sub>1</sub>: [(Fut e<sub>1</sub>: [Nice<sub>A</sub> (x<sub>1</sub>: the weather (x<sub>1</sub>)]<sub>φ</sub>] (e<sub>1</sub>): tomorrow (e<sub>1</sub>))] (X<sub>1</sub>))  
B. INT (S) (A) (X<sub>1</sub>: [(Pres e<sub>j</sub>: [Think<sub>V</sub> (x<sub>k</sub>: 2s (x<sub>k</sub>)]<sub>φExp</sub> (AX<sub>1</sub>)<sub>Go</sub>] (e<sub>j</sub>)] (X<sub>1</sub>))

Secondly, the difference between belief *de re* and *de dicto* shows the necessity of the distinction between the two uses of predications. In Spanish, this difference is formally reflected in negative contexts, as will be shown in 3.2.2.1.

Some apparent advantages which follow from the representation of basic illocutions in the form of abstract illocutionary frames are the following:

(i) Restrictions on the type of predication to be used with a specific  $ILL_E$  can be formulated as selection restrictions. For instance, only predications which designate + control SoA's may be used in imperative constructions, as in:


(46) IMP (S) (A) ( $e_1$ : [ $\{ + \text{control} \}$ ] ( $e_1$ ))<sup>6</sup>

(ii) Illocutionary conversion can be dealt with by means of a set of illocutionary frame formation rules, paralleling the rules by means of which derived predicates are accounted for.

(iii) The 'framing' analysis may be further expanded by considering clauses as the fundamental units to be inserted in discourse frames, thus providing a means to link syntactic description more accurately to other branches of language theory.

The clause model proposed here allows for the application of operators over four different layers:


(47)  $E_1$ : [ $\pi_4$  ILL (S) (A) ( $\pi_3$   $X_1$ : [proposition] ( $X_1$ ))] ( $E_1$ )



$\pi_1$ : predicate operators                       $\pi_3$ : proposition operators  
 $\pi_2$ : predication operators                   $\pi_4$ : illocution operators

Illocution operators represent grammatically reflected modifications of basic illocutions. Some Spanish examples will be given in 3.2.2.3. But first the different types of modality discussed earlier should be assigned a position in this configuration. As inherent modality can be expressed lexically only, I restrict myself to objective and epistemological modality. Objective modality has been characterized in terms of S's evaluation of the SoA designated by a predication, epistemological modality in terms of S's commitment with regard to the content of his statement. Given these characterizations of the two modality types, they may be assigned the positions in (48):

(48)  $E_1$ : [ $\pi_4$  ILL (S) (A) (Epist.mod.  $X_1$ : [proposition] ( $X_1$ ))] ( $E_1$ )



Take, for instance, the following sentence in which linguistic means are applied to express inherent, objective and epistemological modality:

(49) It seems that it is possible that he can cure blindness.

The underlying structure of this sentence, in a language in which both epistemological and objective modality are expressed through grammatical means, is represented in (50):

(50) DECL (S) (A) (Quot.  $X_1$ : [PresPoss  $e_1$ : [Can<sub>v</sub> Cure<sub>vinf</sub> ( $x_1$ : p3 ( $x_1$ ))<sub>Ag</sub> ( $x_j$ : blindness ( $x_j$ ))<sub>Co</sub>] ( $e_1$ )] ( $X_1$ ))

In English, both objective and epistemological modality are expressed through lexical means. This may be represented as:

(51) DECL (S) (A) ( $X_1$ : [Seem<sub>v</sub> ( $X_1$ : [Pres  $e_1$ : [Possible<sub>A</sub> ( $e_j$ : [Can<sub>v</sub> Cure<sub>vinf</sub> ( $x_j$ : p3 ( $x_j$ ))<sub>Ag</sub> ( $x_k$ : blindness ( $x_k$ ))<sub>Co</sub>] ( $e_j$ )] ( $X_j$ ))<sub>phi</sub>] ( $X_1$ ))

Two differences in the syntactic behaviour of objectively and epistemologically modalized sentences in Spanish support the analysis of epistemological modality as a modality that should be assigned a position outside the predication proper, as opposed to objective modality, which has been assigned a position inside the predication.

Firstly, predicates expressing epistemological modality do not allow clitic promotion (see Aissen & Perlmutter 1976; Luján 1979), unlike verbs expressing objective modality. Compare epistemological *parecer* 'seem' in (52) with objectively used *deber* 'must' in (53):

(52) a. Parece saberlo poco.  
 b. \*Lo parece saber poco.  
 'He seems to know little about it.'

(53) a. Debe querer hacerlo bien.  
 b. Lo debe querer hacer bien.  
 'He must want to do it well.'

Secondly, the two groups of predicates behave differently with regard to negative raising (see Luján 1979; Rivero 1979). This difference may be illustrated by means of sentences (54)–(55), which contain the preposition *hasta* 'until'. This preposition requires a negative context, a condition which is apparently not fulfilled in (54b).

- (54) a. Parece que no llega (I) hasta las diez.  
'It seems that he will not arrive until ten.'  
b. \*No parece que llega (I) hasta las diez.  
'It doesn't seem that he will arrive until ten.'
- (55) a. Es probable que no llegue (S) hasta las diez.  
'It is probable that he will not arrive until ten.'  
b. No es probable que llegue (S) hasta las diez.  
'It is not probable that he will arrive until ten.'

An explanation for the ungrammaticality of (52b) and (54b) is that both the clitic and the negative element are part of the content phrase with regard to which S expresses his commitment. Promotion of the clitic or transportation of the negative element to a position outside the scope of the elements through which S expresses his commitment leaves a gap in this content phrase. Therefore (54b) and the non-modalized (56) are ungrammatical for the same reason:

- (56) \*Llega (I) hasta las diez.  
'He comes until ten.'

The formal correlate of this restriction is that no element may pass the (X)-boundaries.<sup>7</sup> The restriction also holds the other way round. The (X)-boundary blocks the scope of negative elements situated outside the proposition restricting (X), as will be illustrated for Spanish in 3. One could therefore say that (X) functions as an inseparable and closed unit.

Further evidence for the correctness of the different positions I have assigned to the different modality types discussed may be derived from the order in which elements expressing modal distinctions of the three types appear in linguistic expressions. On the basis of observations in a number of languages<sup>8</sup> Foley & Van Valin (1984) arrive at the following model of the 'layered structure of the clause':

- (57) (IF(EVID(TENSE(STATUS[... (MOD[NP(NP)(ASPECT[Predicate])]))]))))  
IF = Illocutionary Force, EVID = Evidentials & Subjective modality,  
STATUS = ±Objective modality, MOD = ±Inherent modality.

The order in which the different modality types appear in their model is identical to the one I have given. One language in which this order is neatly reflected is Turkish. Consider the following example (Gerjan van Schaaijk, personal communication).

- (58) Her müslüman Kur'ân-i Kerim-i okuy-abil-meli-ymiş.  
Every muslim Koran-conn Holy-acc read-able-obl-quot.  
'It seems that every muslim should be able to read the Koran.'

Inherent modality is expressed by means of a derived stem *okuyabil-*, produced by a productive predicate formation rule. To this stem two affixes are attached, one indicating moral obligation (*-meli*), and one indicating that S obtained the information from a third person (*-miş*). The order given in (58) is the only possible one.

### 3. MOOD IN SPANISH

#### 3.0. Introduction

In this section the different uses of the Spanish indicative and subjunctive in main clauses and constructions governed by a verbal or non-verbal predicate are studied. In 3.1 I discuss the use of both moods as illocutionary force indicating devices, i.e. as elements through which S can code his communicative intention in his utterance. In 3.2 the use of mood in modalized contexts is gone into. A distinction is drawn between those contexts in which subjunctive or indicative are used obligatorily, and those in which both moods may appear. In the latter case mood inflection can be said to add to the meaning of a sentence, unless the application of both categories can be attributed to differences in the underlying structure of the sentences in which they appear. In 3.3 the remaining uses of indicative and subjunctive in predications governed by a verbal or non-verbal predicate are presented.

#### 3.1. Mood and illocutionary force

The relation between illocutionary force and the use of mood in Spanish is illustrated in the following sentences, in which a proposition is governed by a speech act verb:

- (59) Te aseguro que no es (I) culpa mía.  
'I assure you that it's not my fault.'
- (60) Te ordeno que lo hagas (S) cuanto antes.  
'I order you to do it as soon as possible.'
- (61) Pregunto si vienes (I) mañana.  
'I ask whether you will come tomorrow.'

The indicative is used in propositions embedded under verbs of declaring

and questioning, the subjunctive in propositions embedded under verbs of ordering. If one compares these examples with their non-performative equivalents there is a partial parallelism with respect to the use of mood:

- (62) No es (I) culpa mía.  
'It's not my fault.'
- (63) ¡Hazlo cuanto antes!  
'Do it as soon as possible!'
- (64) ¿Vienes (I) mañana?  
'Will you come tomorrow?'

The indicative is used in both embedded and non-embedded declarative<sup>9</sup> and interrogative sentences, as can be seen by comparing (59) and (61) with (62) and (64). With respect to imperative sentences the situation is less clear-cut. A special imperative inflection is used in (63). The use of this inflection type is restricted to second person familiar singular and plural affirmative in main clauses. Whenever the verb is embedded (60), negated (65) or in second person non-familiar (66) the subjunctive is used:

- (65) ¡No lo hagas (S)!  
'Don't do it!'
- (66) ¡Hagalo (S) Usted cuanto antes!  
'Do it (you-pol.) as soon as possible!'

I have no satisfactory explanation for the fact that the imperative and subjunctive mood are complementary in the way they are.<sup>10</sup> The examples show, however, that both the imperative and the subjunctive mood intervene in the expression of IMP in main clauses. This suggests that application of the approach, proposed by Dik (forthcoming) and outlined in 2.1, in which sentences embedded under speech act verbs are provided with their own illocution is justified. I will adopt this approach in what follows.

Different speech act verbs allow the embedding of more than one sentence type. Among these verbs are those which specify the manner in which a speech act is executed, such as *gritar* 'yell', *escribir* 'write', or the intensity with which this is done, such as *insistir* 'insist' and *sugerir* 'suggest'. The widest range of possibilities is exhibited by the verb *decir* 'say', which allows the embedding of declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences. The nine possibilities of single embedding are:

- (67) a. Dice (I) que vienes (I) mañana. (DECL(DECL))  
b. Dice (I) que si vienes (I) mañana. (DECL(INT))  
c. Dice (I) que vengas (S) mañana. (DECL(IMP))  
d. ¿Dice (I) que vienes (I) mañana? (INT(DECL))  
e. ¿Dice (I) que si vienes (I) mañana? (INT(INT))  
f. ¿Dice (I) que vengas (S) mañana? (INT(IMP))  
Say (he/she) (come (you) (tomorrow)).  
g. ¡Dile (Imp) que viene (I) mañana! (IMP(DECL))  
h. ¡Dile (Imp) que si viene (I) mañana! (IMP(INT))  
i. ¡Dile (Imp) que venga (S) mañana! (IMP(IMP))  
Say (you) (him/her) (come (he/she) (tomorrow)).

What these examples show is that in embedded clauses there is a one to one relation between sentence type and mood inflection type, independent of the sentence type of the embedding clause.

Guitart (1984), from whom the following examples are taken, notes that two groups of verbs show a behaviour similar to that of speech act verbs: those designating mental acts and those designating acts of non-verbal signalling:

- (68) ¡Piensa (Imp) que es (I) fácil! (IMP(DECL))  
'Think that is is easy!'
- (69) ¡Finge (Imp) que estás (I) contento! (IMP(DECL))  
'Pretend that you're happy!'

The similarity of behaviour of speech act verbs and mental act verbs fits in nicely with the view of thinking as 'talking to oneself'. The similar pattern in (69) suggests that an illocutionary component is attributed to non-verbal means of communicating.

Although performative utterances are not very frequent in daily usage, Spanish speakers seem to express a certain *decir*-consciousness when adding the subordinator *que* to independent clauses, as in:

- (70) ¡Que no me gusta (I) nada esa película!  
'I don't like that movie at all!'
- (71) ¡Que no te marches (S) mañana!  
'Don't you leave tomorrow!'
- (72) ¡Que se siente (S) Usted!  
'Sit down!'

In all these cases, the utterance is brought forward with more emphasis. A similar effect is produced by the addition of a performative verb (see

Weijdemans et al. 1982). A possible solution for the description of sentences like (70)–(72) is presented in 3.2.2.3.

### 3.2. Mood and modality

#### 3.2.1. The use of mood in modal contexts

In most cases the occurrence of subjunctive or indicative follows automatically from the context in which the verb on which they are to be expressed appears. This also holds for modal contexts, i.e. contexts in which some modal distinction is expressed. All objectively modalized contexts require the application of either the indicative or the subjunctive and never allow both. In the following overview the different objective modal distinctions are given in the first column, the non-verbal and verbal predicates through which these modal distinctions may be expressed in the second and third column, and the mood these predicates require to be marked on the verbal predicate in their complements in the fourth column:

#### (73) Mood and objective modality

MODALITY	LEXICAL EXPRESSION		MOOD
Actual	<i>Es el caso</i> 'It's the case'	<i>Ver</i> 'See'	Ind
Certain	<i>Es cierto</i> 'It's certain'	<i>Creer</i> 'Believe'	Ind
Probable	<i>Es probable</i> 'It's probable'	–	Subj
Possible	<i>Es posible</i> 'It's possible'	–	Subj
Conceivable	<i>Es concebible</i> 'It's conceivable'	–	Subj
Impossible	<i>Es imposible</i> 'It's impossible'	–	Subj
Obligatory	<i>Es obligatorio</i> 'It's obligatory'	<i>Hace falta</i> 'It needs'	Subj
Customary	<i>Es conveniente</i> 'It's suitable'	<i>Conviene</i> 'It suits'	Subj
Permissible	<i>Es permisible</i> 'It's permissible'	–	Subj
Acceptable	<i>Es aceptable</i> 'It's acceptable'	–	Subj
Forbidden	<i>Está prohibido</i> 'It's forbidden'	–	Subj
Doubtful	<i>Es dudoso</i> 'It's doubtful'	<i>Dudar</i> 'Doubt'	Ind

The indicative is used:

- (i) In predications governed by a predicate through which it is expressed that the SoA designated by the embedded predication is evaluated as actual or certain.
- (ii) In predications governed by a predicate through which it is expressed that the SoA designated by the embedded predication is evaluated as doubtful.

In the case of the non-impersonal verbal predicates these evaluations are attributed to the subject of the matrix clause. An exception should be made for the first person present tense of *creer* 'believe', to which I return in 3.2.2.2. Furthermore, only *de re* doubt ('doubt if') and *de re* belief are intended here.

If negated, the embedding predicates classified as expressing the modal distinctions 'actual' and 'certain' require the subjunctive in their complements. Negation does not affect the use of mood in all other cases.

I return to an explanation of the use of subjunctive and indicative in objective modal contexts in section 4, where the two different uses of the indicative are argued to be related to their use in straightforward declarative and interrogative sentences respectively.

In some of the epistemologically modalized contexts both moods may appear. An overview of their uses is given in (74):

#### (74) Mood and epistemological modality

MODALITY		LEXICAL EXPRESSION		MOOD
Subjective	Epistemic	Cert.	<i>Seguramente</i> – 'Certainly'	Ind(?Subj)
		Prob.	<i>Probablemente</i> <i>Creo</i> 'Probably' 'I think'	Ind(Subj)
		Poss.	<i>Quizás</i> – 'Maybe'	Ind(Subj)
	Boulomaic	<i>Ojalá</i> <i>Espero</i> 'Hopefully' 'I hope'	Subj	
Inferential		<i>Evidentemente</i> <i>Resulta</i> 'Evidently' 'It appears'	Ind	
Quotative		– <i>Parece</i> 'It seems'	Ind	
Experiential		<i>Aparentemente</i> –	Ind	

In 3.2.2.3. I offer an explanation for the fact that in contexts in which elements expressing subjective epistemic modality appear both indicative and subjunctive may be used. But first I present some other contexts allowing mood alternation.

### 3.2.2. Mood alternation

There are some contexts in which the indicative and subjunctive can be contrasted. In two of these contexts, differences in the underlying structure of the contrasting sentences account for the use of both moods. Conditioning factors are the difference between *de re* and *de dicto* interpretations (3.2.2.1.) and the absence or presence of truth commitment on the part of S, combining with the former context (3.2.2.2.). The third context is described in terms of the interaction between illocutionary force and modality (3.2.2.3).

#### 3.2.2.1. *De dicto/de re alternation.* A sentence like

- (75) Creo que Juan está (I) enfermo.  
'I believe that Juan is ill.'

has two readings (cf. Burge 1977):

- (i) I believe the proposition 'Juan is ill.'  
(ii) I have the impression that Juan is ill.

The first one is the *de dicto*, the second one the *de re* reading of (75). The difference is not visible in a positive context. Under negation, however, there is no ambiguity. Compare:

- (76) a. No creo que Juan está (I) enfermo.<sup>11</sup>  
b. No creo que Juan esté (S) enfermo.  
'I don't believe that Juan is ill.'

In the *de dicto* variant (76a) the indicative is maintained. In the *de re* variant (76b) the subjunctive appears, in line with the rules given for objective modality in 3.2.1. In 2.3 the difference between content phrases and predications in their SoA-designating function has been formalized as a difference between (X) and (e). Application of this formalization to (76a) and (76b) yields:

- (77) a. DECL (S) (A) (X<sub>J</sub>: [PresNeg e<sub>j</sub>: [Creer<sub>V</sub> (x<sub>i</sub>: S (x<sub>i</sub>))]<sub>φExp</sub> (X<sub>I</sub>: [Pres e<sub>j</sub>: [Juan está enfermo] (e<sub>i</sub>)] (X<sub>I</sub>))<sub>Go</sub>] (e<sub>j</sub>)] (X<sub>J</sub>))  
b. DECL (S) (A) (X<sub>J</sub>: [PresNeg e<sub>j</sub>: [Creer<sub>V</sub> (x<sub>i</sub>: S (x<sub>i</sub>))]<sub>φExp</sub> (Pres e<sub>j</sub>: [Juan esté enfermo] (e<sub>j</sub>))<sub>Go</sub>] (e<sub>i</sub>)] (X<sub>I</sub>))

What is represented in (77a) is that S rejects a proposition (X<sub>J</sub>) which has been brought forward by one of the participants in the preceding conversation. The representation in (77b) is intended to reflect S's statement that he does not have the impression that the SoA (e<sub>j</sub>) obtains in reality.

The presence of the (X) boundary in (77a) blocks the influence of the negative element in the matrix clause, i.e. it limits the scope of negation. A similar effect was illustrated in 2.3 in with respect to negative raising. The scope differences between (77a) and (77b) may again be illustrated, as in 2.3, by testing the behaviour of sentences in which the embedded predication contains an adverbial expression which requires a negative context, in this case *palabra de* 'word of':

- (78) a. \*No creo que sabe (I) palabra del asunto.  
b. No creo que sepa (S) palabra del asunto.  
'I don't believe he knows a thing about that matter.'

The ungrammaticality of (78a) corresponds with the ungrammaticality of independent clauses like:

- (79) \*Sabe palabra del asunto.  
'He knows a thing about that matter.'

3.2.2.2. *Truth commitment.* In the preceding section I have restricted myself to *de dicto/de re* alternation in sentences in which the matrix verb is marked for present tense and first person singular, i.e. those cases in which subject and speaker are one and the same person. According to different authors (Lléo 1979; Klein 1974, 1977) a somewhat different interpretation should be given to the following sentences, in which the subject is non-first person:

- (80) Antonio no cree (I) que Juan está (I) enfermo.  
'Antonio does not believe that Juan is ill.'  
(81) Antonio duda que Juan está (I) enfermo.<sup>12</sup>  
'Antonio doubts that Juan is ill.'

These sentences have the following interpretation:

- (i) Antonio does not believe/doubts that Juan is ill.  
(ii) S does believe that Juan is ill.

The difference between these sentences and those presented in the preceding section is shown in the ungrammaticality of the following sentence:

- (82) \*Dudo que Juan está (I) enfermo.  
'I doubt that Juan is ill.'

Sentences like (82) with a matrix verb with incorporated negation cannot be used to reject a content phrase, unlike the combination *no + creer*.<sup>13</sup> Therefore (82) contains a contradiction:

- (i) S doubts that Juan is ill.  
(ii) S believes that Juan is ill.

A content phrase with respect to which S expresses his commitment would receive the following structure in the approach presented in 2.3:

- (83) (CertX<sub>1</sub>: [proposition] (X<sub>1</sub>))

Embedding of this structure in the matrix clause of (80) yields the following representation:

- (84) DECL (S) (A) (X<sub>J</sub>: [PresNeg e<sub>j</sub>: [Creer<sub>v</sub> (x<sub>1</sub>: Antonio (x<sub>1</sub>))]<sub>φExp</sub> (CertX<sub>1</sub>: [e<sub>1</sub>: [Juan está enfermo] (e<sub>1</sub>) (X<sub>1</sub>))<sub>G0</sub>] (e<sub>j</sub>) (X<sub>J</sub>))

Confirmation for the analysis of the embedded construction as a subjectively modalized content phrase may be derived from the fact that S can contrast his judgement with the opinion of the subject of the matrix clause in positive terms only. The ungrammaticality of (85) corresponds with the non-existence of the modal adverb *inseguramente* 'uncertainly':

- (85) \*Antonio cree que Juan esté (S) enfermo.  
'Antonio believes that Juan is ill.'

The (not semantically anomalous) interpretation of this sentence would be:

- (i) Antonio believes that Juan is ill.  
(ii) S does not believe that Juan is ill.

Two groups of predicates behave in a way similar to that of believe predicates: verbs of saying, in so far as they refer to *pronouncing* rather than to *executing an illocutionary act* (see Lyons 1977:740), and cognitive predicates. With regard to the first category, compare the following sentences, taken from Guitart (1984):

- (86) a. La carta no dice que la culpa es (I) mía.  
b. La carta no dice que la culpa sea (S) mía.  
'The letter doesn't say that I'm to blame.'

According to Guitart, S's usual intention in uttering (86a) is to express "... that the letter has failed to include the fact that he is indeed to blame", while in uttering (86b) his usual intention is "... to point out that this is not what the letter says (...) while at the same time not admitting that he is to blame ...".

With regard to cognitive predicates, consider:

- (87) a. Antonio no sabe que Juan está (I) enfermo.  
b. ?Antonio no sabe que Juan esté (S) enfermo.  
'Antonio doesn't know that Juan is ill.'

Sentence (87b) is highly marked. The semi-factive character of *saber* 'know' requires a positive judgment of S with regard to the content of the embedded proposition. If S is not able to express his positive commitment it would be more appropriate to use:

- (88) Antonio no sabe si Juan está (I) enfermo.  
'Antonio doesn't know whether Juan is ill.'

Sentence (87b) may only be used as a free indirect speech report of:

- (89) No sé que Juan esté (S) enfermo.  
'I don't know that Juan would be ill.'

In which S expresses his reservation with respect to a statement of another person. One might say that, apart from this use, verbs like *saber* 'know' cannot be used if S cannot commit himself to the truth of the content of the embedded proposition, as illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (90):

- (90) \*No sé que Juan está (I) enfermo.  
'I don't know that Juan is ill.'

This sentence contains a contradiction, contrary to (91) (see 3.2.2.1.):

- (91) No creo que Juan está (I) enfermo.  
'I don't believe that Juan is ill.'

Therefore, to account for the semi-factive character of cognitive predicates I assume that these predicates allow the embedding of (CertX)-complements only. It is in this sense that speaker presupposition distinguishes itself from logical presupposition (see 3.3.2.). This approach to cognitive predicates furthermore supports the idea expressed in 2.3 that (X) might be the basic unit of knowledge.

Special attention should be given to the use of cognitive predicates in what Guitart (1984:161) calls 'admission of cognitive failure'. An example is:

- (92) No sabía que mi artículo tenía (I) errores.  
'I didn't know there were mistakes in my article.'

Through the use of the indicative in (92) S indicates that he does know now what he did not know at an earlier moment.<sup>14</sup> Just as S may contrast his knowledge with that of a third person, he may contrast his actual knowledge with his knowledge in an earlier stage. If K stands for knowledge, S for speaker, X for third person, ts for the moment of speaking and tr for the moment referred to, the following two formulae hold for (87a) and (92):

- (93)  $K_{S_{ts}} \neq K_{X_{ts}}$  (87a)  
 $K_{S_{ts}} \neq K_{S_{tr}}$  (tr < ts) (92)

In both cases the embedded proposition represents  $K_{S_{ts}}$ .

3.2.2.3. *Mitigation and reinforcement.* The last case of contrasting use of mood in modalized contexts concerns the possibility of using both the indicative and the subjunctive in subjectively modalized contexts, as was indicated in the overview of the use of mood in epistemologically modalized contexts in (74). Some examples are:

- (94) Quizás vienen/vengan (I/S) mañana.  
'Maybe they will come tomorrow.'
- (95) Sospecho que vienen/vengan (I/S) mañana.  
'I assume that they will come tomorrow.'

The use of the subjunctive in sentences like (94)–(95) corresponds to a higher degree of reservation of S with regard to the truth of the content of the proposition (see Hooper 1974:30; Bergen 1978). The effect is comparable to the one produced by the use of the past tense forms of the English modals expressing subjective epistemic modality, as in:

- (96) He may/might be on his way by now.

One might simply assume that the difference between the sentences of each pair should be accounted for in terms of different degrees of commitment in a subjective modal sense. However, I would like to consider a different solution, which is mainly based on the fact that a small group of Spanish

modal verbs may appear in both the indicative and the past subjunctive. Note that in (94)–(95) the verb inflected for indicative and subjunctive appears in a context which has already been modalized subjectively, while the modal verbs in the main clauses of the following sentences receive this inflection without other modalizing elements being present:<sup>15</sup>

- (97) Usted debe/debiera (I/PastS) enseñarle su biblioteca.  
'You must/should show him your library.'
- (98) Quiero/Quisiera (I/PastS) que Usted le enseñe/enseñase (PresS/PastS) su biblioteca.  
'I want/would like you to show him your library.'
- (99) ¿Puede/Pudiera (I/PastS) enseñarle su biblioteca?  
'Can/could you show him your library?'

Apart from its use as an indicator of illocutionary force, these are the only possible uses of the subjunctive in independent clauses.

To account for the difference in meaning of the sentence pairs (94)–(99) I once more return to speech act theory. It should be noted that some of the modal distinctions discussed in 2.2 are at the same time central notions in speech act theory. Some of Searle's (1969) felicity conditions for the execution of a speech act, the addressee-based preparatory conditions and the speaker-based sincerity conditions, are given in (100):

- (100) S-based and A-based felicity conditions

Speech act	S-based cond.	A-based cond.
Assertion	S believes p	A doesn't know p
Command	S wants p	A is able to do p

It cannot be a coincidence that in the formulation of the S-based conditions the two basic notions of subjective modality are used. On the contrary, one would expect, given the analysis of the clause as representing the different levels of the speech act, that the S-based conditions, formulated in terms of speaker commitment, are incorporated in the structure of the clause, as in:

- (101) DECL (S) (A) (Believe<sub>S</sub> X<sub>1</sub>: [proposition] (X<sub>1</sub>))
- (102) IMP (S) (A) (Want<sub>S</sub> e<sub>1</sub>: [predication] (e<sub>1</sub>))

These might be suitable representations for the logical structure of different



types of speech acts, but not for the general structure of linguistic expressions. For one thing, the S-based sincerity conditions are often just presupposed and not expressed. For another, (102) is incorrect. What S does when making explicit the sincerity condition of a command is precisely avoiding issuing an imperative by replacing it by a statement. Therefore, for those cases in which S gives expression to the sincerity condition of a command, the following structure should replace (102):

(103) DECL (S) (A) (Want<sub>S</sub> X<sub>1</sub>: [proposition] (X<sub>1</sub>))

In analyses of indirect speech acts (Searle 1975; Haverkate 1979) different strategies to decrease the directness of a speech act have been distinguished. One of these strategies is for S to give expression to the S-based condition, as in (98). As has been noted above, the S-based conditions of commands and assertions coincide with two of the subjective modal distinctions made. Another strategy is for S to question the A-based condition, as in (99). The A-based ability condition of commands coincides with one of the inherent modal distinctions made. The use of sentences like (97) represents a third strategy: instead of creating an obligation by issuing an order S states that an obligation exists. In the latter case A can question the source of this obligation, a feature of objective modality (see 2.2.2.).

What may be derived from these coincidences between certain modal distinctions and central notions of speech act theory is that one of the functions of modalizing an utterance is to arrive at a lesser degree of directness of the speech act involved. Note that, with regard to the modal distinctions discussed here,

- (i) the modal verbs which may be used to give expression to the S-based sincerity conditions have been analyzed earlier as elements which take a content phrase in their scope;
- (ii) the modal verbs which may be used to give expression to the A-based preparatory condition have been analyzed earlier as SoA-internal;
- (iii) the modal verbs which may be used to arrive at a lesser degree of directness without mentioning either of these conditions have been analyzed as occupying an intermediate position, taking the SoA in their scope.

An interesting hypothesis would be that these verbs represent a scale of decreasing directness the deeper they are embedded, corresponding to the different positions assigned to the three different types of modality discussed in 2.2, as in:

(104) Degrees of directness

decreasing directness



ILL<sub>E</sub> (S) (A) (Subj.Mod. X<sub>1</sub>: [Obj.Mod. e<sub>1</sub>: [Pred<sub>β</sub> (x<sub>1</sub>) (x<sub>2</sub>) ... (x<sub>n</sub>)](e<sub>1</sub>)](X<sub>1</sub>))

The following series seems to support this hypothesis

- (105) a. ¡Enseñele su biblioteca!  
'Show him your library!'  
b. Quiero que Usted le enseñe su biblioteca.  
'I want you to show him your library.'  
c. Usted debe enseñarle su biblioteca.  
'You must show him your library.'  
d. ¿Puede Usted enseñarle su biblioteca?  
'Can you show him your library?'

If correct, the hypothesis may at the same time provide a partial explanation for the diachronic development of modal verbs, which tend to be reinterpreted along the following line (see Goossens 1985a-b):

(106) Diachronic development of modal verbs



ILL<sub>E</sub> (S) (A) (Subj.Mod. X<sub>1</sub>: [Obj.Mod. e<sub>1</sub>: [Pred<sub>β</sub> (x<sub>1</sub>) (x<sub>2</sub>) ... (x<sub>n</sub>)](e<sub>1</sub>)](X<sub>1</sub>))

If one of the functions of modalizing an utterance is to decrease the degree of directness, the reinterpretation of modality might be related to the wearing off of politeness expressions and the conventionalizing of indirectness strategies.

Returning now to the use of mood in the modalized sentences presented at the beginning of this section, I interpret the use of the (past) subjunctive as the application of a grammatical means through which S further mitigates the force of his speech act, and not as a device to indicate a lesser degree of commitment with regard to the content of his speech act. This view implies that this use of mood should be explained in terms of the rules that govern verbal interaction and the ways in which these rules are reflected in

linguistic structure. By using the subjunctive in (94)–(95) or by using the past tense form of the modal *may* in (96), S leaves more room for A to disagree with him or for himself to withdraw from a position taken. By using the subjunctive in (97)–(99) S exposes a higher degree of politeness and leaves more room for refusal. I will use the term ‘mitigation’<sup>16</sup> as a label for these different communicative strategies. Mitigating expressions, whether lexical or grammatical, should take the whole clause as representing the speech act in their scope. The underlying structure of the mitigated variants of (94)–(99) may therefore be represented as:

(107) Mit.ILL<sub>E</sub> (S) (A) (X<sub>1</sub>: [proposition] (X<sub>1</sub>))

That mitigation takes the whole clause in its scope is reflected in Spanish in the fact that mitigation affects all inflected forms of the clause, as in (108b)–(109b).

- (108) a. Quizás *es* (I) seguro que la ceguera *puede* (I) ser vencida.  
 b. Quizás *sea* (S) seguro que la ceguera *pueda* (S) ser vencida.  
 ‘It may/might be possible that blindness can be cured.’
- (109) a. *Quiero* (I) que Usted le *enseñe* (PresS) su biblioteca.  
 b. *Quisiera* (PastS) que Usted le *enseñase* (PastS) su biblioteca.  
 ‘I want/would like you to show him your library.’

Mitigation favours modalized clauses. However, not all modal distinctions are equally compatible with it. Mitigating a statement while at the same time expressing strong commitment with respect to its content in a subjective modal sense is not a likely combination, although it does occur, as can be seen in the following example, cited by Bolinger (1976:47):

- (110) Segurísima estoy de que por culpa mía se muda (S) el tiempo.  
 ‘I’m more than certain that it’s my fault that times change.’

Some parenthetical verbs may be classified as lexical mitigating expressions:

- (111) Juan viene (I) mañana, creo/temo.  
 ‘Juan will come tomorrow, I think/I’m afraid.’

The counterpart of mitigation is reinforcement. Just as S may wish to express a higher degree of reservation, he may wish to impose his speech act more strongly upon A or, as it were, put an exclamation mark behind his utterance. One of the ways in which this is done in Spanish has been illustrated in 3.1.1. The addition of the subordinator *que* to a clause has a reinforcing effect, as in:

- (112) ¡Que no me gusta nada esa película!  
 ‘I don’t like that movie at all!’

The scope of the reinforcing expression *que* is reflected in its initial position in the utterance. In Turkish, a V-final language, the reinforcing affix *-dir* takes the final position in the utterance:<sup>17</sup>

- (113) Bu, Türkçe gazete değil-dir.  
 This Turkish newspaper not-reinf.  
 ‘This is not a Turkish newspaper at all!’

The underlying structure of sentences like (112)–(113) may be represented as:

(114) Reinf.ILL<sub>E</sub>(X<sub>1</sub>: [proposition] (X<sub>1</sub>))

Reinforcement may be expected to favour non-modalized clauses and clauses containing a compatible modal distinction, such as subjective strong commitment. The performative use of speech act verbs may be analyzed as a lexical reinforcing device.

In chapter 2 illocutionary force and modality were analyzed as pertaining to different layers of the clause. Mood in Spanish has been discussed with respect to each of these layers earlier in this chapter. In this section some cases have been presented in which illocutionary force and modality seem to coincide. I hope to have shown that, rather than making the distinction drawn invalid, it is by virtue of this distinction that these cases can be handled in terms of the interaction between the different layers of the clause.

### 3.3. Remaining uses of mood in embedded predications

Two groups of predicates which can take a predication as one of their arguments and do not give expression to a modal distinction have not yet been discussed: verbs of causation, and predicates of subjective feeling. Verbs of causation, whether negated or not, always require the subjunctive in their finite complements, which might indicate that the subjunctive is the unmarked mood in this grammatical context. Predicates of subjective feeling allow both moods in their complements, as illustrated in (115):

- (115) Me molesta que Juan no está/esté (I/S) aquí.  
 ‘It bothers me that Juan isn’t here.’

Guitart (1982) shows that the indicative is used if S judges the information contained in the embedded predication to be new to A. This is reflected in the fact that the indicative is always used in focus constructions:

- (116) Lo que es curioso es que Juan no lo sabe (I).  
'What is strange is that Juan doesn't know it.'

The non-clefted variant allows both moods:

- (117) Es curioso que Juan no lo sabe/sepa (I/S).  
'It's strange that Juan doesn't know it.'

Although the subjunctive is used most frequently. This is not surprising, as predicates of subjective feeling are factive and therefore have complements which are 'implied by the Speaker to be true' and designate 'identifiable SoA's' (Bolkestein 1981). Focus assignment to the complement as a whole is nevertheless possible, and it is this focus assignment which triggers the use of the indicative. Confirmation for this view can be derived from the changes Guitart (1982) observes in the use of the indicative in this context among Spanish-speaking immigrants in the USA. S may judge the information contained in the complement to be new to A in terms of:

- (i) A's knowledge of the preceding conversation.
- (ii) A's knowledge of the speech situation.
- (iii) A's general knowledge.

Guitart notes a decreasing use of the indicative as a result of interference, which may be described as a change from (i) to (iii). Whereas speakers of Spanish who have not been subject to interference judge the newness of information in terms of (i)–(ii), Spanish-English bilinguals judge the newness of information in terms of (iii), and use the indicative only if the information contained in the complement is judged to be unexpected by A.

A certain grammaticalization of the Topic/Focus distinction seems to be responsible for the fact that *el hecho de que* 'the fact that' sentences in pre-matrix position take the subjunctive only, whereas in post-matrix position they allow both moods (see Guitart 1984; Terrell & Hooper 1974).

Before going into the formalization of factivity and the use of mood in factive complements I would like to return to the distinction that has been drawn earlier between the content-representing function of propositions and SoA-designating function of predications. Given this distinction and its formalization, the following representations may be given to terms designating first, second and third order entities:

- (118) First, second and third order entities
- |               |   |
|---------------|---|
| First order:  | $(x_1: \text{Pred}_N(x_1))_{Sf}$        |
| Second order: | $(e_1: [\text{predication}](e_1))_{Sf}$ |
| Third order:  | $(X_1: [\text{proposition}](X_1))_{Sf}$ |

These representations account for the possibility of referring to objects, SoA's and content phrases respectively. The way in which the difference between predications and propositions is reflected in Spanish has been discussed in 3.2.2.1. A further distinction should be drawn now to distinguish between the factive and non-factive uses of predications.

In 2.2.2 it was argued that S may evaluate a SoA with respect to its actuality. One might say now that once S reaches the conclusion to which the objective modal distinction 'certain' has been applied, he stores the information that the predication under consideration refers to a particular situation obtaining in reality or in a hypothesized situation as part of his knowledge, as in:

- (119)  $(X_1: [d1e_1: [\text{predication}](e_1)](X_1))$

Dik (1986a) uses representations similar to the one given in (119) as units of 'referential knowledge', but restricts himself to first order entities.

Returning now to the difference between factive and non-factive complements, I assume that a factive complement refers to one of the entities available to S on the basis of his referential knowledge, whereas a non-factive complement refers to a possible SoA which is under evaluation. The difference between non-factive, factive and semi-factive (see 3.2.2.2) complements can be represented as follows:

- (120) Non-factive, factive and semi-factive complements
- |               |   |
|---------------|---|
| Non-factive:  | $(e_1: [\text{predication}](e_1))_{Sf}$             |
| Facter:       | $(d1e_1: [\text{predication}](e_1))_{Sf}$           |
| Semi-factive: | $(\text{Cert}.X_1: [\text{proposition}](X_1))_{Sf}$ |

Bolkestein (1981) proposes that factive complements be provided with a term operator 'f', but mentions the possibility of using the definiteness operator 'd' as an alternative. It follows from (120) that I prefer the latter analysis. Confirmation for this view may be derived from the fact that verbal nouns, if used to replace a finite factive complement, are necessarily definite, as the nominalized equivalent of (115) shows:

- (121) Me molesta la ausencia de Juan.  
'The absence of Juan bothers me.'

The definiteness of factive complements is furthermore reflected in the fact that they may be preceded by determiner *el* 'the', as in:

- (122) Me molesta *el* que Juan no está/esté (I/S) aquí.  
'It bothers me (*the*) that Juan isn't here.'

The conditions for the use of the subjunctive and indicative in factive complements can now be represented as follows:

(123) Indicative and subjunctive in factive complements

( $d1e_1$ : [predication] ( $e_1$ ))<sub>SFTop</sub> → Subj

( $d1e_1$ : [predication] ( $e_1$ ))<sub>SFFoc</sub> → Ind

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapter the different uses of mood in Spanish have been treated, following the general observations made in chapter 2 with regard to the different levels to be distinguished within the structure of the clause. The question remains to be answered now whether these uses are somehow related. In order to do so, I first go into the relation between two of the different uses of mood: in objectively modalized predications, and in propositions governed by an illocutionary frame.

Recall that two types of frames were distinguished in 2.3: illocutionary frames and predicate frames. Illocutionary frames govern *propositions*, which restrict (X) and represent the content of an utterance. Objective modal predicate frames govern *predications*, which restrict (e) and designate SoA's. A comparison of the use of mood in the constructions governed by these two types of frames reveals some interesting correlations. In (124) an overview is given of the use of indicative and subjunctive in propositions governed by an illocutionary frame, including reinforced and mitigated declaratives, and in non-factive predications governed by a predicate expressing some objective modal distinction. The use of mood, given in the right hand column, holds for both propositions in (X) governed by the corresponding illocutionary frame in the left hand column and predications in (e) governed by a predicate of the type indicated in the second column:

(124) Mood in propositions in ( $X_1$ ) and predications in ( $e_1$ )

(Qualified) Illocutionary frame	Predicate frame expresses	Mood in embedded construction
	Epistemic modality	
DECL (Neutral) DECL (Reinforced) DECL (Mitigated)	Actual (Neutral) Certain Less than certain	Ind Ind Subj
IMP	Deontic modality	Subj
INT	Doubt	Ind

The correspondence between certain basic illocutions and categories of objective modality with respect to the use of mood seems to have the same explanation in all the different cases presented in (124): There is a connection between S's:

- (i) presenting part of his knowledge in a declarative sentence/stating that something is consistent with his knowledge, with various sub-distinctions at both levels;
- (ii) creating an obligation in an imperative sentence/stating that according to his knowledge some obligation exists;
- (iii) asking A for information in an interrogative sentence/stating that he is unable to evaluate a predication in terms of his knowledge.

Note with regard to the notion of doubt that only *de re* doubt ('doubt if') as opposed to *de dicto* doubt ('doubt that') is intended here.

The correspondence between the uses of mood related to illocutionary force and objective modality should not lead to the conclusion that one single principle underlies these different uses. Such an approach would not be able to account for the fact that the rules for the application of mood in objective modal contexts may be violated in the context of mitigation:

- (125) Quizás es (I) seguro que viene (I) mañana. (Neutral)  
 Quizás sea (S) seguro que venga (S) mañana. (Mitigated)  
 'It may/might be certain that he will come tomorrow.'

Of all the different uses of mood presented in (124) there is only one in which mood can be said to fulfil a distinguishing function: qualification of a declarative sentence is expressed through the use of indicative or subjunctive. In all other cases the use of indicative or subjunctive follows automatically from the predicate frame or illocutionary frame selected by S.

Some other contexts in which the indicative and subjunctive alternate have been presented in 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2. In both cases the different underlying structures assigned to the alternating sentences, representing their *de re* and *de dicto* interpretation, obligatory combined with positive truth commitment of S in some cases, account for the appearance of both moods.

The use of both moods in factive complements governed by a predicate of subjective feeling remains to be discussed here. It was argued in 3.3 that in the latter context the Topic/Focus distinction is reflected in the use of the subjunctive or indicative respectively. Comparing the use of the indicative in this context with its use in the only other context in which the alternating use of mood can be said to add to the meaning of a sentence, i.e. its use in non-mitigated declarative sentences, the definitions of focus and declarative shed some light on the relation between these uses:

FOCUS: 'The Focus presents what is relatively the most important or salient information in the given setting.' (Dik 1978:19)

DECL: 'S wishes A to add the content of the linguistic expression to his pragmatic information.' (Dik forthcoming)

Again, there are both coinciding and differentiating elements in the triggering conditions for the indicative: FOCUS and DECL coincide in as far as in both cases S acts upon the assumption that the information contained in the predication is new to A; they differ in as far as in the case of DECL S intentionally wants A to take into account the information contained in the proposition restricting (X) in his future behaviour, whereas in the case of Focus assignment to factive complements, S presupposes that the SoA designated by the predication restricting (e) is new to A. In the latter case it is S's subjective feeling about this SoA that he wants A to take into account in his future behaviour.

Consequently, in those cases in which the indicative and subjunctive can be said to add to the meaning of a sentence, S has to answer the following questions:

- (i) Whether or not he wishes to express his reservation with regard to his assertion, as reflected in mitigation of a declarative sentence;
- (ii) Whether or not he judges part of his (referential) knowledge to be unshared by A, as reflected in Focus assignment to a factive complement.

These questions relate to two kinds of general distinctions which have been made in this paper to account for the alternating and non-alternating uses of mood in Spanish: the distinction between different layers of the clause as representing the different subacts of a speech act; and the distinction between non-factive, factive and semi-factive complements as representing a SoA under evaluation, an identifiable referent and a unit of S's knowledge respectively.

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#### NOTES

1. I would like to thank three anonymous referees of the *Journal of Semantics* for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, which is a revised version of *Working Papers in Functional Grammar* 22, 'The Spanish mood system'. Parts of sections 2.2 and 2.3 were presented earlier in Hengeveld (1987). Abbreviations used in this paper: *General*: FG = Functional Grammar, SoA = State of Affairs, A = addressee, S = speaker (in text) or

subjunctive (in examples), I = indicative; *Wordclasses*:  $\beta$  = any wordclass, N = noun, V = verb, A = adjective; *Variables*: E = speech act, X = propositional content, e = state of affairs, x = individual; *Illocutionary frames*: DECL = declarative, INT = interrogative, IMP = imperative; *Semantic functions*: sf = any semantic function, Ag = agent, Go = goal,  $\phi$  = zero, Exp = experiencer, Freq = frequency; *Term operators*: d = definite, i = indefinite, l = singular, m = plural; *Predicate operators*: Progr = progressive; *Predication operators*: Pres = present, Fut = future, Poss = possible, Non-act = non-actual, Neg = negation; *Proposition operators*: Quot = quotative, Boul = boulomaic modality, Cert = certain.

2. The distinction between three different types of modality presented in this section has been inspired by Lyons' (1977, ch. 16-17) discussion of modality. Other sources which have been used are Allwood et al. (1977), Bolkestein (1980), Chung & Timberlake (1985), Foley & Van Valin (1984), and Mateus et al. (1983).
3. Cf. Dik's (1986b) 'pictures'.
4. Compare the following quote from Benveniste (1966): 'Est-ce que je me decris croyant quand je dis *je crois (que ...)*? Sûrement non. L'operation de pensée n'est nullement l'objet de l'énoncé;'
5. See Vet (1986) for the representation of tense and time adverbials used here.
6. I assume that there is no intermediate propositional level in imperatives.
7. Although subject raising seems to violate this restriction, it does not if it is regarded as the result of double syntactic function assignment in the underlying predication, as proposed in Dik (1979).
8. Partly based on Bybee (1985).
9. Some examples of the limited use of the Subjunctive in main and embedded declarative sentences are presented in 3.2.2.3.
10. A purely formal explanation for the difference between the use of the Imperative mood in affirmative main clauses and the Subjunctive mood in negative main clauses and embedded clauses in the second person familiar might be that the Imperative forms are bare forms of the predicate which do not allow the application of a predicate operator (Tense in embedded clauses, Negation in main clauses).
11. Note that sentences like (76a) and (81) can be used only in a context in which the proposition under consideration is explicitly or implicitly present in the context.
12. In some Spanish dialects this example is judged to be ungrammatical.
13. I therefore disagree with Klein (1977), who proposes to classify *dudar* 'doubt' and *no + creer* as two members of one group of predicates.
14. In this sentence the subjunctive could be substituted for the indicative in the complement, in which case the speaker would not commit himself to the truth of the embedded proposition.
15. An explanation for the use of the past subjunctive in these cases might be that the use of the present subjunctive would cause ambiguity as it is also used for imperatives. In subjectively modalized contexts this ambiguity cannot arise, as only declaratives can be subjectively modalized.
16. The terms 'mitigation' and 'reinforcement' are taken from Haverkate (1979), in which a discussion of a number of mitigating and reinforcing devices in Spanish may be found.
17. This is only one of the uses of *-dir*. See Lewis (1967).

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